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The current sovereign debt and balance of payments
crisis of some European countries, contrary to many
public impressions, is not a ‘child of the Monetary
Union’. There have been similar crises in Europe,
most recently the 1992/93 crisis of the former
European Monetary System (EMS), which also
imposed significant financial and economic burdens
on Germany.1 Past crises, however, had an impact
primarily on the exchange rates; in the Monetary
Union with its fixed exchange rates, the crisis affects
interest rates and interest rate spreads on government
bonds. Regardless of these different symptoms, how-
ever, the root causes of these crises are very similar: it
was and is basically a crisis of confidence – confidence
in the fiscal-policy competence of a country, and ulti-
mately its competitiveness. Because only a regained
competitiveness can lay the foundation for a recovery
of government finances and the private financing of
the current account deficit, which currently in the
case in Greece and other peripheral states is being
publicly financed via the refinancing facilities of the
banks of these countries in the Eurosystem and
which is reflected in the so-called Target2 balances.
These balances are accordingly not the ‘fire’ but the
‘smoke’, not the cause but a consequence of deep-
seated imbalances.
The ‘classic way’ to restore competitiveness in a sys-
tem of flexible or at least variable exchange rates is
currency devaluation. Accordingly, this path is often
proposed as a solution for the current sovereign debt
crisis in Greece, resulting in Greece being excluded
from, or more politely put, leaving the monetary
union. Regardless of the legal and political implica-
tions of such a move, and in particular the risk of a
negative impact on the European unification process
in the form of increasing disintegration and political
strife, as observed also in previous currency crises, in
a regime of flexible exchange rates with a currency
depreciation we would ultimately only be ‘buying
time’; a devaluation would not resolve the deeper-
seated problem of the competitiveness of a country –
the investment environment, labour-market regula-
tions, efficiency of the civil service and the adminis-
trative infrastructure, ultimately the ‘business model’
of a country. There is even a risk that with the price
reduction effect of a devaluation, fundamental prob-
lems will be seen as less urgent and their solution will
be postponed and that devaluations will lead, via
import prices, to spurts of inflation (price-wage spi-
rals) that have a harmful effect on growth.
When fixed exchange rates are in effect, i.e. in a mon-
etary union, the adjustment process proceeds, as
many pointed out before the monetary union was cre-
ated, via the ‘real exchange rates’, i.e. via an adjust-
ment of the total wage and price structure and the
other factors on which the competitiveness of a coun-
try depends. This reform path via the ‘fundamentals’
is certainly more painful than an adjustment of the
nominal exchange rate (which leaves the internal
price relationships initially unchanged), but it
addresses the structural roots of a currency or bal-
ance of payments crisis and therefore offers the
chance of a sustainable solution.
The treaties of the European Union in principal offer
the advantage of being able to develop and deploy an
institutional framework that triggers and ensures the
required deep structural reform measures as well as
structural reforms that must occur in addition to the
necessary adjustment of wages and prices (in the case
of Greece, sweeping reforms of the administrative
infrastructure, privatisation and the efficiency of
public services). This institutional framework, that
needs to be developed further, was damaged by the
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increases in Germany that were necessary in terms of stability policy
but that went beyond what was necessary in terms of the domestic
economy.2004/2005 decision to weaken the Stability and
Growth Pact, a historic mistake that was labelled a
‘reform’ at the time. With a functioning Stability
Pact, the Greek deficit in 2009 would not have been
the 3.6 percent reported to the EU Commission that
then turned out to be 15.4 percent, which ultimately
was the trigger for the crisis of confidence and rising
spreads on government bonds. With the ‘ex ante safe-
guarding’ of the Stability Pact having been decisively
weakened in 2005, the heads of state and government
decided in 2010 to implement the temporary solution
of EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) and
from 2013 the permanent solution of ESM
(European Stability Mechanism), an ‘ex post adjust-
ment mechanism’ that is based on two major C’s
(credit + conditions). These legal pillars of the new
institutional framework will only be successful, how-
ever, if they are supported by concomitant economic
incentive mechanisms.
Following the decisions of the Summit of 21 July
2011, a sense of relief was felt not only politically
but also in the markets, which was noticeable in the
declining spreads on Greek government bonds.
After a prolonged period of uncertainty, which was
fuelled almost every day by new debt restructuring
models (and for which the solution was often pro-
posed without the most important partners, name-
ly the central banks of the Eurosystem that are
responsible for the inclusion of Greece in the
European money market), the summit decisions
demonstrated the ability of the eurozone to take
action and averted at least for the immediate future
the danger of negative political dynamics in the
euro area. After the experience with the decisions of
May 2010, however, there are doubts as to whether
the positive market reaction will last. 
The positive aspects of the Summit decisions, in addi-
tion to avoiding a (further) mixing of central bank
functions and fiscal policy, are above all the avoidance
of false solutions such as the introduction of new
taxes, the prevention of (explicit) Eurobonds and thus
a communitarisation of debt without a simultaneous
communitarisation of spending decisions (i.e. a polit-
ical union),2 as well as the promise to strengthen the
Stability and Growth Pact and the further involve-
ment of the IMF in the volume and control of the
programmes.
The agreement in principle on an additional credit
and structural adjustment programme for Greece
with the impressive volume of an additional 109 bil-
lion euros is realistically the only way to achieve a
broad-based improvement in the competitiveness of
the country and to influence decisions regarding a
greater efficiency of the public sector, a reform of the
administrative infrastructure, a sweeping privatisa-
tion, a reduction of bureaucracy and an improvement
of the investment environment, and not least finding
a way to curb widespread corruption. In contrast to
no longer reversible one-off measures such as debt
cancellation, debt assumption or debt guarantees, the
method of a gradual issuing of credit (in tranches)
will permit a continuous and credible monitoring of
progress on reforms. 
The decision to involve the private sector, which poli-
cy-makers underscored so much, is ambivalent, in my
opinion, since this was bought at the price of consid-
erable public securities vis-à-vis the investors (and
thus was more of a ‘bail-out’ than a ‘bail-in’); but still,
the foreseeable negative side effects of a strict restruc-
turing were limited through the avoidance of a ‘credit
event’ for the credit default swaps (CDS) as well as a
recapitalisation assurance for the Greek banking sys-
tem. Also the key requirement for confidence in the
European monetary policy of ‘adequate security’
(Article 18 ESCB Statute) by means of the pledges
(which still need to be concretised) of additional col-
lateral for Greek bonds was largely respected. 
The  longer-term assessment of the decisions and
their impact on public confidence in the markets,
however, depends largely on the extent to which the
newly designed institutional framework creates the
right incentives. As experience shows, well-inten-
tioned regulations and monitoring process are most-
ly in vain if false incentives within the institutional
framework lead to a weakening of the specifications
and requirements.
In this connection, the policy decisions – the details of
which are still open – on secondary market purchases
by the European funds EFSF and ESM give cause for
concern as well as the granting of a ‘precautionary
principle’ of the European funds. Also the (further)
reduction in interest rates for the programme loans to
come ‘close to the financing costs of EFSF’ (Section
III of the Summit Declaration of 21 July 2011) are
not aimed at increasing pressure in the direction of a
country’s own capital market viability and repayment
of the European credits by the peripheral states.
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Purchases on the secondary market also entail the
temptation to battle the ‘smoke’ (higher interest
rates) instead of the fire and the fire sources (ineffi-
ciencies of fiscal and economic policy). And unlike
purchases in the primary market, which is equivalent
to the granting of a loan, it is also difficult to connect
secondary market purchases with the criterion of
conditionality. 
The link with due conditionality is also the main
problem of the planned precautionary credit line,
since the flexible credit line (FCL) of the IMF, which
is used as a model, is only based on a general assess-
ment of the financial soundness of a country and not
on actual conditions. But a strict conditionality of aid
is also anchored in Article 136(3) TFEU, which is to
be the legal basis of the future ESM as of 2013. The
(few) content specifications of the planned addition
of the institutional framework must not be eroded
before they even take effect. 
In the detailed working out of the decisions, which
will take place under the Polish Council presidency,
the principle of individual fiscal responsibility of each
member state of the monetary union should be given
the greatest possible weight and in particular the prin-
ciples of conditionality and market discipline should
be consistently implemented. This could, for example,
consist of embedding the ‘precautionary credit line’ in
a similarly ‘precautionary’, but binding adjustment
programme and to concentrate secondary market
purchases on an offer to the Eurosystem to take over
the accumulated government bonds (SMP). In terms
of the agreed interest rate cuts for the programme
loans, it should at least be assured that the mistakes
are not repeated that were made in the phase of inter-
est rate convergence of the monetary union after
1998; i.e. the relief effect of low interest rates should
be used to the full to reduce budget deficits and not be
used for other objectives.
The ultimate litmus test for the credibility of the deci-
sions is likely to be the promised strengthening of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Key elements here are the
experience of the past, the introduction of a reverse
majority and not only in the ‘preventive part’ but
especially in the corrective part of the pact, in other
words in the determination of an increased deficit and
the start of an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP).
Also necessary are credible sanctions, including the
retention of European funds ‘at source’ and the sus-
pension of a country’s voting rights in fiscal and bud-
get-related decisions of the European bodies. Also the
possibility of ‘procedural loops’ that were introduced
during the weakening of the Pact in 2005 and largely
neglected by the public, i.e., the endless repetition of
the ‘prelude to sanctioning’ (such as recommenda-
tions and their publication) should be eliminated to
the benefit of a credible escalation mechanism. 
The important goal of preventing contagion to other
countries of the currency area can be best achieved –
as with the medical risk of infection – by the immuni-
sation of those who are likely to become infected. In
terms of the sovereign debt crisis and the balance of
payments crisis, this means concretely implementing
fiscal responsibility as an incentive to increase com-
petitiveness and thereby the confidence in the respec-
tive countries. This includes clear ex ante-rules of an
‘orderly insolvency’ of a member state of the EMU in
case this state is definitely not capable or not willing
to come along with the necessary adjustment. These
rules should not only address the problem of recapi-
talization of banks but also how an insolvent state
can get access to the money market (after the default
of a state the ECB/Eurosystem can no longer accept
government bonds as collateral – see Article 18
ESCB-statue). The media often refers to the insistence
on this point of fiscal responsibility as a ‘lack of soli-
darity’ of the core European countries, especially
Germany and other European countries. True solidar-
ity, however, is reflected in sustainability, in the cre-
ation of a long-term stable basis for the monetary
union. Solidarity presupposes solidity.